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Coercion and Choice Under the 
Establishment Clause 
Cynthia V. Ward' 
In recent Establishment Clause cases the Supreme Court has found 
nondenominational, state-sponsored prayers unconstitutionally "coercive" -
although attendance at the events featuring the prayer was not required by the 
state; religious dissenters were free to choose not to say the challenged prayers; 
and dissenters who so chose, or who chose not to attend the events, suffered no 
state-enforced sanction. Part I of this Article lays out the historical background 
that gave rise to the coercion test, traces the development of that test in the 
Court's case law, and isolates the core elements in the vision of coercion that 
animates the test. Part II proposes a new reading of coercion under the 
Establishment Clause that keeps faith with the conceptual boundaries of coercion 
while also responding to the particular constitutional concerns that gave rise to 
the coercion test and to the particular holdings in the Supreme Court cases that 
have deployed it. Finally, Part III suggests that the coercion test, as 
reconstructed, could be the basis for restoring internal coherence and external 
predictability to constitutional analysis under the Establishment Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few areas of U.S. Supreme Court interpretation have attracted such 
strong and universal criticism as the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.1 Over the half century that the Court has been deciding 
cases under the Clause,2 its muddled and inconsistent decisions have 
confounded scholars, lower courts, and at times, even members of the 
Court itsel£.3 So far, this tangled body of doctrine has resisted every 
attempt to bring clarity, predictability, and coherence to the 
constitutional standard for evaluating state action under the Clause. The 
Court's first formal methodology for analyzing Establishment Clause 
issues, the so-called Lemon test,4 proved so ad hoc and unpredictable in 
application that it has receded into the background as an analytical tool.5 
In the mid 1980s, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor proposed a "refinement" 
of the Lemon test, centered on the intuition that the government violates 
1 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
' The first Supreme Court case decided on Establishment Clause grounds was Everson 
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
' See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow II), 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("Our jurisprudential confusion [in Establishment Clause cases] 
has led to results that can only be described as silly."); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I find it a sufficient embarrassment that our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence regarding holiday displays has come to 'require scrutiny more commonly 
associated with interior decorators than with the judiciary."' (citations omitted)); County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674-76 (1989) (Kennedy, J ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (accusing Court of embracing "jurisprudence of minutiae . . . . Deciding 
cases on the basis of such an unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable with the 
imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional adjudication. 'It would be 
appalling to conduct litigation under the Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark 
case, with experts testifying about whether one display is really like another, and witnesses 
testifying they were offended - but would have been less so were the creche five feet 
closer to the jumbo candy cane."' (citation omitted)). 
' The test is named for the case in which it first appeared, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971). 
5 It has not, however, been ejected from the toolbox altogether. See, e.g., Lamb's 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its 
grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school 
attorneys of Center Moriches Free Union School District. ... Over the years ... no fewer 
than five of the currently sitting Justices have ... personally driven pencils through the 
creature's heart ... and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so .... The secret of the Lemon 
test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is thPre to scare us (and our audience) 
when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will."); infra note 
114 and accompanying text (noting use of test in 2005 case). 
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the Establishment Clause when the purpose, or the reasonable effect, of 
its action is to "endorse" or disfavor religious activity.6 But O'Connor's 
"endorsement test" also drew heavy fire from both inside7 and outside8 
the Court, and it has thus far failed to win the consistent allegiance of 
any Justice other than its author.9 
In the late 1980s, Justice Anthony Kennedy put forward the concept of 
coercion as the gauge for an Establishment Clause violation, and Justice 
Kennedy's "coercion test" has recently caught on.10 In two Establishment 
Clause cases since the early 1990s, the Court has tied the question of 
constitutionality to the question of whether the challenged state action 
coerced citizens into supporting or participating in religious activities. If 
coercion exists, then the state action, be it aid to private religious schools 
or references to God in public schools, is unconstitutional.11 Thus, in the 
1992 case of Lee v. Weisman/2 the Court held that a nondenominational 
prayer at a public school graduation ceremony "coerced" religious 
dissenters into participating and that such coercion violates the 
Establishment Clause.13 Likewise, in the 2000 case of Santa Fe Independent 
School District v. Doe/4 the Court held that a student-delivered prayer at 
a high school football game fell afoul of the Clause because, inter alia, the 
prayer coerced potentially dissenting students into participating.15 And 
although the Supreme Court never reached the merits of plaintiff 
' Justice O'Connor announced the endorsement test in the case of Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
' See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (calling endorsement test "a recent, and in my view most unwelcome, addition to our 
tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence," and describing the test as "flawed in its 
fundamentals and unworkable in practice"). 
' See also infra text accompanying note 43. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 801 (1993). 
• Justice O'Connor has continued vigorously to defend the endorsement test. See, e.g., 
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow II), 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 (2004) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
10 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); infra text accompanying notes 44-67. 
11 The reverse is not necessarily true. That is, a finding that the challenged state 
behavior was not coercive does not, by itself, prove there has been no violation of the 
Clause. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 n.47 ("[T]his Court repeatedly has stated that 
'proof of coercion' is 'not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment 
Clause." (citations omitted)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (dictum) (rejecting 
proposition that plaintiffs must show coercion in order to prove Establishment Clause 
violation). 
12 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
13 Id. at 587-88. 
14 530 u.s. 290 (2000). 
15 Id. at 311-12. 
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Michael Newdow's Establishment Clause claim in the 2004 case of Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (Newdow Il)/6 the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in Newdow v. U.S. Congress (Newdow l)/7 did. Drawing 
heavily on Lee and Santa Fe, the Ninth Circuit ruled that school-
sponsored recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was coercive and 
therefore unconstitutional because the Pledge contains the words "under 
God."18 
A circuit split has continued the debate over the constitutional status 
of the Pledge of Allegiance under the coercion test. In Myers v. Loudon 
County Public Schools,19 the plaintiff challenged a Virginia law that 
required daily recitation of the Pledge in public schools.20 The Fourth 
Circuit held that the Pledge did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because, unlike the school-sponsored prayers that the Supreme Court 
found unconstitutionally coercive in Lee, the Pledge of Allegiance is 
primarily a patriotic, not a religious, exercise.21 A month later, and 
across the country in California, plaintiff Newdow won another victory 
at the district court level in the Ninth Circuit, where he had filed a new 
complaint alleging the same Establishment Clause violation as in his 
prior case, but free from the procedural defect that caused the Supreme 
Court to remand that case.22 The United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss 
Newdow's complaint, ruling that under Ninth Circuit precedent (from 
Newdow I), the words "under God" in the Pledge violate the rights of 
school children to be "free from a coercive requirement to affirm God."23 
At some point the issue appears likely to move up the ladder once again, 
giving the Supreme Court a second chance to decide the merits of 
Newdow's Establishment Clause claim. 
Next time, the Court should embrace the chance to do so. Although 
the basic intuition underlying the coercion test has strong roots in our 
constitutional history, the test, as deployed in Lee and Santa Fe, has 
16 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
17 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) 
18 Id. at 487 ("Because we conclude that the school district policy impermissibly coerces 
a religious act and accordingly hold the policy unconstitutional, we need not consider 
whether the policy fails the endorsement test or the Lemon test as well."). 
19 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005). 
20 See VA. CODE ANN.§ 22.1-202(C) (2005). 
21 Myers, 418 F.3d at 407. 
22 In the new case, Newdow has enlisted two other sets of parents and their children, 
all of whom concededly have standing to bring suit, in his new claim. Newdow v. Cong. of 
the U.S. (Newdow Ill), 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E. D. Cal. 2005). 
23 Id. at 1240. 
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produced more confusion than clarity in an area of constitutional 
doctrine already mired in doctrinal disarray. In those cases the Court 
found that a state-sponsored, nondenominational prayer was "coercive" 
even though attendance at the event featuring the prayer was not 
mandatory, religious dissenters at each event were free to choose not to 
say the prayer and dissenters who so chose, or who chose not to attend, 
suffered no state-enforced sanction. In what sense, critics have 
wondered, has the state unconstitutionally coerced citizens into 
supporting or garticipating in religion when the state has required them 
to do neither? The Court attempted to answer this question in Lee, by 
introducing the concept of indirect coercion as a basis for an 
Establishment Clause violation.25 The Court conceded in Lee that 
attendance at graduation was "voluntary" in the sense that students 
were not required to go and their academic status was unaffected by 
nonattendance.26 The Court also acknowledged that individual 
dissenters who chose to attend the ceremony were not required to say 
the prayer and that no state-authored sanction would follow their choice 
not to say it.27 In short, no direct coercion was involved. Nonetheless, the 
Court held that, as a practical matter, graduation is mandatory for many 
students because their parents and families value their attendance.28 The 
Court concluded that although students who chose not to say the prayer 
would face no sanction inflicted by the school, they might well face 
social pressure from their peers as a result of their nonparticipation.29 
Thus, indirect coercion became a valid basis for challenging state action 
under the Establishment Clause. 
The casual observer may well be taken aback by this proposition. 
Since when does social pressure from one's peers constitute coercion by 
24 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636-38 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 
Court's notion that a student who simply sits in 'respectful silence' during the invocation 
and benediction (when all others are standing) has somehow joined - or would somehow 
be perceived as having joined - in the prayers is nothing short of ludicrous .... But let us 
assume the very worst, that the nonparticipating graduate is 'subtly coerced' ... to stand! 
Even that half of the disjunctive does not remotely establish a 'participation' (or an 
'appearance of participation') in a religious exercise."). 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 48-58. 
26 Lee, 505 U.S. at 583 ("The parties stipulate that attendance at graduation ceremonies 
is voluntary" in the sense described above.). 
17 ld. at 593 (stating that school-sponsored prayer at issue "places public pressure, as 
well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand, ... or, at least, maintain respectful 
silence during the invocation and benediction."); id. ("Finding no violation under these 
circumstances would place objectors in the dilemma of participating ... or protesting."). 
28 See id. at 594-95. 
,. Id. at 593. 
2006] Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause 1627 
the state? On what theory of coercion can such holdings be justified? 
What are its conceptual underpinnings, and what room, if any, does it 
leave for the state to "accommodate" religion without running afoul of 
the Establishment Clause?30 This Essay proposes answers to those 
questions. 
Part I lays out the historical background that gave rise to the coercion 
test, traces the development of the test in the Court's case law, and 
isolates the core elements in the vision of coercion that animates the test. 
Part II addresses the idea of coercion directly, exploring its contours and 
comparing it to the conception of coercion that was enforced in Lee and 
Santa Fe. I propose a new reading of coercion under the Establishment 
Clause that keeps faith with the conceptual boundaries of coercion while 
also responding to the particular constitutional concerns that gave rise 
both to the coercion test and to the holdings in Lee and Santa Fe. In Part 
III, I suggest that the coercion test, as reconstructed, could be the basis 
for restoring internal coherence and external predictability to 
constitutional analysis under the Establishment Clause. 
I. COERCION IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE jURISPRUDENCE 
As an independent measure of government compliance with the 
Establishment Clause, the coercion test is a recent development. It is not, 
however, the only test the courts use to decide claims under the Clause. 
Indeed, federal courts found challenged school policies in both Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Do/1 and Elk Grove Unified School District v. 
Newdow (Newdow II)32 unconstitutional not only under the coercion test, 
but also under the so-called Lemon and endorsement tests. These two 
tests foreshadowed the emergence of coercion as a central element in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
A. The Lemon and Endorsement Tests 
In the 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,33 taxpayers challenged state 
statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provided aid to private 
elementary and secondary schools, including religious schools. The 
30 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (stating that 
Establishment Clause should be interpreted in light of "(g]overnment policies of 
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for a religion [that] are an accepted part of 
our political and cultural heritage"). 
31 530 u.s. 290 (2000). 
32 542 u.s. 1 (2004). 
33 403 u.s. 602 (1971). 
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Supreme Court held that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause 
because (in significant part) they fostered excessive government 
entanglement with religion.34 Drawing on prior Establishment Clause 
decisions over several decades, the Lemon Court developed a three-part 
analysis for state actions that are challenged under the Clause. To 
survive constitutional inspection, a challenged state action must: (1) 
have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal or primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster "excessive 
entanglement" between government and religion.35 
To state the test is to raise the vagaries with which the Court has 
wrestled ever since Lemon. First, what is a "secular purpose"? This 
prong of the Lemon test must allow the state to make laws that are 
motivated by a desire not to squelch but to accommodate religious 
practice. Indeed, the state may well be obligated to pass such laws under 
the command of the Free Exercise Clause.36 But if such pro-religion laws 
are allowable or even necessary, what does the phrase "secular purpose" 
mean? 
Second, how does one measure the "principal or primary effect" of a 
law or state action and reliably distinguish it from secondary effects that 
may nevertheless have important impacts on religious practice? Even 
more puzzling, what does it mean to "advance" or "inhibit" religion? 
Again, doesn't the government in some sense "advance" religion when it 
passes laws attempting to accommodate religious practice? 
Finally, the Lemon test fails to tell the state, ex ante, how to avoid 
"excessive entanglement" between government and religion. The Court 
has said over and over again, in Lemon and other cases, that the 
Constitution does not forbid all connection between government and 
religion and that some relationship between the two is not only 
constitutional but also necessary.37 But the test articulated in Lemon 
34 Id. at 615. 
35 Id. at 612-13. 
36 It is basic hornbook doctrine that the Free Exercise Clause requires the government 
to affirmatively accommodate good-faith religious practice. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1307 (6th ed. 2000) (noting "natural antagonism" between 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and commenting that "[t]his tension ... often 
leaves the Court with having to choose between competing values in religion cases"). 
37 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) ("In every Establishment Clause 
case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing 
unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, 
as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible."); Lemon, 403 
U.S. at 614 ("[T]otal separation [of government and religion] is not possible in an absolute 
sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."). 
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draws no principled distinction between allowable and "excessive" 
entanglement. 
Unsurprisingly, the Lemon test produced a confused set of court 
opinions and has been widely criticized by both courts and 
constitutional scholars.38 In the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly}9 Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor suggested a "refinement" of Lemon that has since 
become known as the endorsement test. In Justice O'Connor's view: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in 
the political community. Government can run afoul of that 
prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement 
with religious institutions. . . . The second and more direct 
infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. 
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the community.40 
In her concurrence in Newdow II, Justice O'Connor summarized the 
endorsement test as it has been applied in the Establishment Clause 
context: 
In order to decide whether [unconstitutional government] 
endorsement has occurred, a reviewing court must keep in mind 
two crucial and related principles. First, because the endorsement 
test seeks "to identify those situations in which government makes 
adherence to a religion relevant ... to a person's standing in the 
political community," it assumes the viewpoint of a reasonable 
observer. . . . Second, because the "reasonable observer" must 
embody a community ideal of social judgment, as well as rational 
judgment, the test does not evaluate a practice in isolation from its 
origins and context. Instead, the reasonable observer must be 
deemed aware of the history of the conduct in question, and must 
understand its place in our Nation's culturallandscape.41 
38 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 8, at 801 ("[T]he ambiguity of the test left the Court 
leeway to interpret each prong in varying ways, producing a bewildering patchwork of 
decisions as the justices engaged in a tug-of-war over the interpretation of the test. Not all 
of the decisions were wrong ... but they certainly lacked doctrinal coherence."). 
39 Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. 
40 Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
41 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow II), 542 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2004) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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However, the endorsement test raised at least as many questions as it 
answered. Once again, the ambiguities in the test have attracted strong 
criticism. The Court has conceded that not all government action that in 
some way "advances" religion constitutes an endorsement of it.42 Yet, 
the test as formulated fails to offer a dear and predictable method of 
determining which advancements are unconstitutional and which are 
not. As summarized by Professor Mich<.el Paulsen: 
The basic problem with the endorsement test is that it is no test at 
all, but merely a label for the judge's largely subjective impressions. 
. . . Justice O'Connor has awkwardly attempted to remedy this 
obvious problem by postulating a neutral "objective observer." 
Moreover, this observer must be one "familiar with this Court's 
precedents.". . . The "objective observer" canard is merely a 
cloaking device, obscuring intuitive judgments made from the 
individual judge's own personal perspective .... The endorsement 
test does not resemble anything that could be called "law."43 
The perceived defects of both the Lemon and the endorsement tests 
pointed to the need for a new and more coherent standard by which to 
measure Establishment Clause violations. In the late 1980s, Justice 
Kennedy advanced the idea of coercion as the basis for such a standard. 
B. The Arrival of the Coercion Test 
1. Allegheny, Lee, and Santa Fe 
Justice Kennedy first articulated the coercion test for Establishment 
Clause violations in an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.44 He wrote of the need for "diligent 
observance of the border between accommodation [of religion] and 
42 According to the Lemon test, a government action is unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause only if it has a principal or primary effect that advances or inhibits 
religion. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
43 Paulsen, supra note 8, at 815-16 (citations omitted). But see County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (stating that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, outlining 
parameters of endorsement test, "provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating 
governmental use of religious symbols"). 
44 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-02, 620-21 (holding that Christian creche displayed at 
Christmas season promoted religious message and violated Establishment Clause, while 
Chanukah menorah was symbol for holiday with secular meaning and did not violate 
Establishment Clause) 
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establishment" and identified coercion as the means of discerning that 
border: 
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous 
indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it 
in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so." These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it 
would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some 
measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation 
to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain a state-
established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental 
exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing .... 
The freedom to worship as one pleases without government 
interference or oppression is the great object of both the 
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. Barring all attempts to 
aid religion through ?ovemment coercion goes far toward 
attainment of this object.4 
Justice Kennedy concluded in Allegheny that "[a]bsent coercion, the risk 
of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic 
accommodation is minimal."46 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Allegheny also introduced a distinction 
between direct and indirect coercion that would become important in the 
Court's future discussions of the concept. Justice Kennedy argued that 
unconstitutional coercion may be either direct - involving an explicit, 
state-imposed sanction for nonpreferred religious behavior or belief -
or indirect - involving less overt but nonetheless genuinely coercive 
state actions that impinge on religious liberty.47 Kennedy gave no firm 
45 Id. at 659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation 
omitted). 
46 Id. at 662. 
'
7 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "some of our recent cases reject the view that 
coercion is the sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation"; these cases have held 
that proof of government coercion is not required to demonstrate an Establishment Clause 
violation. Id. at 660. But Kennedy argued that this is true only if "coercion" means "direct 
coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of religion that the Framers knew." Id. at 
660-61. That is, proof of direct coercion is not a necessary component of a successful 
Establishment Clause claim. Unconstitutional coercion, however, may also be indirect, and 
Kennedy seems to argue here that once the idea of indirect coercion is incorporated, 
coercion does become the "touchstone" of an Establishment Clause violation. Thus, 
Kennedy comments in his Allegheny opinion: "[O]ur cases have held only that direct 
coercion need not always be shown to establish an Establishment Clause violation." Id. at 
662 n.l. By contrast, "the prayer invalidated in Engel was unquestionably coercive in an 
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shape to the concept of indirect coercion in Allegheny. Three years after 
that decision, however, the Court put the idea to use. In Lee v. Weisman,48 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, finding that the state had 
unconstitutionally "coerc[ed]" dissenting students by inviting a clergy 
member to say a nonsectarian, but monotheistic, prayer at a public high 
school graduation ceremony.49 
The coercion test was the sole basis for the decision in Lee. The Court 
held that it need not consult the other tests for Establishment Clause 
violations because "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion 
or its exercise"50 and the school policy in question failed this threshold 
requirement.51 Once again treating liberty of conscience as a central 
concern not only of the Free Exercise Clause but also of the 
Establishment Clause, Justice Kennedy spoke of the special need to 
protect that liberty "from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools."52 In particular, "our decisions ... recognize, 
among other things, that prayer exercises in public schools carry a 
particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern may not be limited to 
the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there."53 In the case of 
the school-sponsored prayer in Lee, the Court cited the 
undeniable fact ... that the school district's supervision and control 
of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as 
well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, 
at least, maintain respectful silence during the invocation and 
benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as 
real as any overt compulsion. 54 
The unconstitutional compulsion in Lee consisted not in the school 
forcing students to pray, which would be an instance of direct coercion 
and would clearly be unconstitutional, but in the school-created 
indirect manner .... " ld. Although the vagueness of the language makes this less than 
certain, Justice Kennedy appears to argue that a showing of either direct or indirect state 
coercion should be both necessary and sufficient to prove an Establishment Clause 
violation. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 8, at 823 ("It is probable ... that Justice Kennedy 
continues to believe that his Allegheny formulation is the correct one -not only a doctrinal 
minimum but a maximum as well- and will adhere to it in future cases."). 
48 505 u.s. 577 (1992). 
" ld. at 592-93. 
50 Id. at 587. 
51 ld. at 599. 
52 Id. at 592. 
53 Id. (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at 593. 
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possibility that dissenting students might be subjected to social pressure 
from their peers: 
Research in psychology supports the common assumption that 
adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their peers 
towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of 
social convention. To recognize that the choice imposed by the State 
[between participation in the prayer and protest against it] 
constitutes an unacceptable constraint only acknowledges that the 
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy 
than it may use more direct means. 55 
Thus, the Court invalidated the school-sponsored prayer in Lee on the 
ground that potential social pressure from a dissenting student's peers 
constitutes coercion of that student by the state. 
In emphatic dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia attacked the Court's 
"psycho-coercion" test, declaring: "The Court's argument that state 
officials have 'coerced' students to take part in the invocation and 
benediction at graduation ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point on it, 
incoherent."56 In Justice Scalia's view, the concept of coercion is indeed 
relevant to the evaluation of state action under the Establishment Clause, 
but the Court's interpretation of that concept was fatally flawed. 
Invoking history as a benchmark for the proper meaning of coercion 
within the Clause, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of 
religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial 
support by force of law and threat of penalty. Typically, attendance at 
the state church was required; only clergy of the official church 
could lawfully perform sacraments; and dissenters, if tolerated, 
faced an array of civil disabilities .... The Establishment Clause was 
adopted to prohibit such an establishment of religion at the federal 
level. . . . [T]here is simply no support for the proposition that the 
officially sponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction 
read by Rabbi Gutterman - with no one legally coerced to recite 
them - violated the Constitution of the United States. To the 
contrary, they are so characteristically American they could have 
come from the pen of George Washington or Abraham Lincoln 
himself.57 
55 Id. at 593-94. 
56 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia anticipated at least one pertinent 
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Thus, Justice Scalia agreed that acts of direct coercion- threats backed 
by legal sanctions - are barred by the Establishment Clause, but he 
opposed the Court's view that indirect coercion is also prohibited by the 
Clause.58 
Justice Scalia failed to convince his colleagues that they had pushed 
the meaning of coercion too far. Eight years after Lee, the Court put its 
shoulder to the concept once again, invalidating a school policy that 
permitted, but did not require, students to elect a student speaker to 
deliver "a brief invocation and/or message" at school-sponsored football 
games.59 Drawing heavily on Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in 
Lee, the majority in Santa Fe held that the school's policy violated the 
Establishment Clause, even though the policy (1) did not require 
students to attend football games; (2) did not require that any message, 
religious or otherwise, be given at the games, but left that option to the 
results of a student-run election; and (3) did not require, in the event that 
students chose to elect one of their number to speak at the games, that 
the message delivered be religious.60 Recalling its analysis in Lee, the 
Court once again equated possible social pressure from student peers 
with coercion by the state: 
To assert that high school students do not feel immense social 
pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the 
extracurricular event that is American high school football is 
"formalistic in the extreme." We stressed in Lee the obvious 
connection between the Court's holding in Lee and its future Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. In his Lee dissent, Scalia noted that: 
[S)ince the Pledge of Allegiance has been revised since Barnette to include the 
phrase "under God," recital of the Pledge would appear to raise the same 
Establishment Clause issue as the invocation and benediction. If students were 
psychologically coerced to remain standing during the invocation, they must also 
have been psychologically coerced, moments before, to stand for (and thereby, in 
the Court's view, take part in or appear to take part in) the Pledge. Must the 
Pledge therefore be barred from the public schools (both from graduation 
ceremonies and from the classroom)? ... Logically, that ought to be the next 
project for the Court's bulldozer. 
ld. at 639. 
58 ld. at 642 (Scalia,]., dissenting) ("[W]hile I have no quarrel with the Court's general 
proposition that the Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,' . . . I see no warrant for 
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty - a brand of 
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of who have made a career reading the 
disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud."). 
59 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 298 n.6 (2000). 
"' See id. passim. 
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observation that "adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from 
their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in 
matters of social convention." High school home football games are 
traditional gatherings of a school community .... Undoubtedly, the 
games are not important to some students, and they voluntarily 
choose not to attend. For many others, however, the choice between 
whether to attend these games or to risk facing a personally 
offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one. The 
Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this 
difficult choice upon students .... 61 
Indeed, the majority opinion continued, 
[e]ven if we regard every high school student's decision to attend a 
home football game as purely voluntary, we are nevertheless 
persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper 
effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious 
worship. For "the government may no more use social pressure to 
enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."62 
2. Coercion and the Pledge of Allegiance 
It was thus a very well-established vision of coercion that animated the 
Ninth Circuit opinions in the first Pledge of Allegiance case.63 Reciting 
the Supreme Court's declaration in Lee that "at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise," the en bane Ninth 
Circuit panel in Newdow v. United States Congress (Newdow I) placed the 
challenged public school policy, requiring daily teacher-led recitations of 
the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, on the same constitutional 
page as the challenged policies in Lee and Santa Fe.64 The Ninth Circuit 
imported the Supreme Court's view of coercion as articulated in those 
two prior cases and came to the unsurprising conclusion that the policy 
requiring daily classroom recitation of the Pledge also violated the 
Establishment Clause: 
The school district's policy here, like the school's action in Lee, places 
students in the untenable position of choosing between 
61 Id. at 311-12. 
" Id. at 312 (emphasis added) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 594). 
63 See Newdow v. U.S. Cong. (Newdow I), 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 
F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
.. Newdow I, 328 F.3d at 486-88. 
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participating in an exercise with religious content or protesting .... 
As the Court observed with respect to the graduation prayer in Lee: 
"What to most believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable 
request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices, in a 
school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an 
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious 
orthodoxy." ... 
. . . [E]ven without a recitation requirement for each child, the 
mere presence in the classroom every day as peers recite the 
statement "one nation under God" has a coercive effect. 65 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the public school policy at issue 
in Newdow I violated the Establishment Clause because, among other 
things, it coerces students by exposing them to references to God and 
forcing them to choose between "participating" in such references (by 
hearing them) and provoking possible social backlash by protesting.66 
In his concurrence in Newdow II, Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that 
the Ninth Circuit's holding in Newdow I follows directly from the Court's 
analysis of coercion in Lee: 
Adherence to Lee would require us to strike down the Pledge policy, 
which, in most respects, poses more serious difficulties than the 
prayer at issue in Lee. A prayer at graduation is a one-time event, 
the graduating students are almost (if not already) adults, and their 
parents are usually present. By contrast, very young students, 
removed from the protection of their parents, are exposed to the 
Pledge each and every day. . . . I conclude that, as a matter of our 
precedent, the Pledge policy is unconstitutional.67 
At the same time, Justice Thomas's opinion in Newdow II raises the core 
question of whether the concept of coercion reaches as far as the Court 
stretched it in Lee. If not, what really explains the precedents that appear 
65 Id. at 488. The Court's support for that declaration is somewhat confusing. Its 
opinion goes on to say that "the coercive effect of the Pledge is also made even more 
apparent when we consider the legislative history of the Act that introduced the phrase 
'under God.' These words were designed to be recited daily in school classrooms." Id. at 
488. The Court thus infers the effect of the Act from its purpose, or "design." See also infra 
text accompanying notes 117-18. 
66 Newdow I, 328 F.3d at 488. 
67 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow II), 542 U.S. 1, 46-49 (2004) 
(Thomas,]., concurring). Immediately following the excerpt above, Justice Thomas goes on 
to say: "I believe, however, that Lee was wrongly decided. Lee depended on a notion of 
'coercion' that ... has no basis in law or reason." Id. at 49. The majority in Newdow II based 
its decision on the procedural issue of respondent's standing and never reached the merits 
of Newdow's Establishment Clause claim. 
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to give the Ninth Circuit's holding in Newdow I such a strong 
constitutional pedigree? 
C. The Supreme Court's Conception of Coercion: Four Burning Questions 
The coercion test, as deployed in Lee, Santa Fe, and Newdow II, raises at 
least four sets of questions. First, from the Court's discussions in those 
key cases it would seem that the state has been "coercive" under the 
Establishment Clause not only when it expressly penalizes citizens for 
refusing to engage in state-sponsored religious activity, but also when it 
presents citizens with a choice between religious and nonreligious 
activity and the choice is one that the citizen would not be required to 
make in the absence of the challenged state-sponsored activity. But what 
is the relationship between coercion and choice? Is there an important 
connection between these two concepts? If so, how should that 
connection play out in a constitutional analysis? 
Second, what is the role of intentionality in a finding of direct or 
indirect coercion under the Establishment Clause test? Both Lee and 
Santa Fe invite us to examine the state's intention to abridge the 
constitutional rights of religious dissenters. The Court forbids the state 
from "us[ing]" social pressure - pressure from other students - to 
enforce religious orthodoxy.68 The verb "use" suggests that the Court 
seeks to bar the state from intentionally exploiting peer pressure in the 
pursuit of religious conformity. But the Court did not rely on evidence 
that the schools in either Lee or Santa Fe knowingly engaged in the 
creation or application of such peer pressure.69 Its finding of state 
coercion in these cases was not, therefore, predicated on a finding of 
intentionality. But if intention is not a requisite element of state coercion, 
what is required to view the state as the source of coercion that violates 
the Establishment Clause? 
Third, what is the analytical distinction between "direct" and 
"indirect" coercion, and what is the proper place of indirect coercion in 
constitutional analysis? The Court's holdings in Lee and Santa Fe rely 
explicitly on the idea that the Establishment Clause prohibits the state 
not only from directly coercing religious orthodoxy - for example, by 
expressly requiring students to say a school-sponsored prayer- but also 
from indirectly doing so - for example, by "using" social peer pressure 
68 Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 594 (1992). 
" See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 324-25; Lee, 505 U.S. at 636-37. 
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to change the religious preferences or behavior of dissenting students. 
Yet, the Court has declined to give definite shape to its vision of indirect 
coercion, to discuss the relationship between direct and indirect coercion, 
or to examine the very troubling issue of boundaries and limits that the 
introduction of indirect coercion inevitably introduces into the mix. A 
prohibition on direct coercion contains easily discemable limits that tell 
the state, ex ante, which behavior is unconstitutionally coercive and 
which is not.70 Unless carefully limited and defined, a constitutional ban 
on indirect coercion could easily mire the Court even deeper in the very 
kind of intuitional, ad hoc jurisprudence that has led to strong and 
widespread condemnation of the Lemon and endorsement tests. 
Finally, the Pledge of Allegiance cases in particular raise a fourth issue, 
one that arises from the fact that, unlike a school-sponsored prayer, the 
Pledge is not primarily a religious exercise. The Pledge first came into 
being containing no religious language at all; the words "under God" 
were added in 1954 as a congressional afterthought. Not only can the 
Pledge exist independently of those two words, but it did so exist, as a 
purely patriotic exercise to which religious language was subsequently 
added during the Cold War for the political purpose of distinguishing 
American political culture from "atheistic Communism."71 This makes it 
necessary to answer a question that never arose in the school prayer 
cases because those cases involved exercises whose chief purpose was to 
recognize and celebrate a deity. Even if we agree that the government 
may not constitutionally coerce citizens into preferred religious behavior 
and we also agree on a workable definition of "coercion" for 
Establishment Clause purposes, the question that the Pledge cases 
highlight is: "Coercion of what?" Coercion of religious exercise violates 
the Establishment Clause, but coercion of patriotic exercise does not.72 
Does the mere presence of the words "under God" tum the Pledge into a 
"religious exercise"? If so, why? If not, then how can we discern the 
70 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 57 (quoting from Scalia dissent in Lee). 
" See, e.g., Newdow I, 292 F.3d at 597, amended by 328 F.3d 466. 
n The Fourth Circuit makes this point in Myers v. Loudon County Public Schools. 418 
F.3d 395, 406-08 (2005) ("[A]ll of the cases holding that indirect coercion of religious activity 
violates the Establishment Clause presuppose that the challenged activity is a religious 
exercise . ... [A]lthough religious exercises in public schools, even if voluntary, may violate 
the Constitution because they can indirectly coerce students into participating, nothing in 
any of the school prayer cases suggests the same analysis applies when the challenged 
activity is not a religious exercise. And distinguishing this case ... is the simple fact that 
the Pledge, unlike prayer, is not a religious exercise or activity, but a patriotic one .... Even 
assuming that the recitation of the Pledge contains a risk of indirect coercion, the indirect 
coercion is not threatening to establish religion, but patriotism."). 
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boundary line between nonreligious exercises that in some way 
"acknowledge" religion- exercises that the state may mandate without 
violating the Establishment Clause73 - and those genuinely "religious" 
exercises that do invoke the proscriptions of the Clause? In short, what 
exactly is it that makes a state-sponsored exercise "religious" in nature? 
II. THE CONCEPT OF COERCION 
Consider a paradigmatic case of coercion. A robber advances on you 
in a dark alley, points a gun in your face, and declares: "Your money or 
your life."74 What exactly makes his action "coercive"? 
A. The Elements of Coercion 
The robbery scenario is coercive for at least three reasons. First, it 
presents the victim with a choice that exists only because of the coercive 
behavior of the robber. Second, it involves the threat of a sanction for 
failure to choose in accordance with the will of the robber. Third, the 
threat from the robber is intentional, in the senses described below.75 
1. A Forced Choice 
The robbery victim would presumably like to hang on to both her 
money and her life; the fact that she must now choose between them is 
the direct result of the coercer's behavior. It follows that a coercer's 
victim makes the choice against her will: without the presence of the 
coercer's credible threat of harm, she would behave otherwise. If I hold 
a gun on you and command, "Walk into that cave or I will shoot you," 
and (unknown to me) you are an avid spelunker and were already on 
your way to explore that very cave, then I have not coerced you into 
walking in. In a coercive situation, the coercee's world, and will, are 
altered because of the coercer's threats. 
Although the choice between one's money and one's life will probably 
be an easy one for most people, it is nevertheless a real choice: a choice 
in which the coercee deliberates between alternatives and can be 
expected to select that which, from his or her perspective, causes the 
73 However, under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, the calculation may be 
different. See West Virginia v. Barnett.?, 319 U.S. 624,641-42 (1943). 
" See, e.g., Michael Gorr, Toward a Theory of Coercion, 16 CAN. J. PHIL. 383, 385 ("The 
paradigm example of coercion is provided by a conditional threat, e.g., 'Your money or 
your life."'). 
" See infra text accompanying notes 83-87. 
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least harm.76 In illustration, remember the old joke that plays off the 
robber-victim scenario. Gun-toting robber approaches male victim, 
points his gun and demands: "Your money or your wife." Victim 
hesitates. Robber finally asks: "Well?" Victim responds: "''m thinking, 
I'm thinking!" 
The point of the joke is a serious one, for we can easily imagine a 
victim totting up the pros and cons and rationally choosing to risk his 
life rather than hand over his money. Consider, in illustration, the case 
of Jesica Santillan, a teenager who died in 2003 following a botched 
organ transplant at Duke University Medical Center in North Carolina.77 
Several years before the fatal transplant, Jeska's parents paid a smuggler 
to transport the family from its native Mexico to the United States in 
order for Jesica to receive medical treatment for her heart condition.78 
Suppose for a moment that you are Jeska's mother. You have 
converted all your assets into cash and placed the cash in a bank account. 
Now you are on your way to meet the smuggler who has promised, in 
return for that money, to transport you and Jesica to the United States 
where she will receive life-saving treatment. Just as you reach your 
bank, a robber walks up, points a gun at your head, and demands: 
76 See, e.g., H.J. McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S. J. PHIL. 335, 336 
(1980) ("Coercion and force need to be distinguished, ... because when one is coerced, one 
still acts. When subjected to force, one does not act at all; rather one is acted upon; things 
are done to one or via one .... By contrast, the coerced person acts. He does what he does 
as a result of coercion. He may well not like doing what he does and may much prefer to 
act in other ways; and he may do what he does only because he is coerced. Nonetheless, 
he, the coerced person does what he does; he chooses to do it."); Michael J. Murray & 
David F. Dudrick, Are Coerced Acts Free?, 32 AM. PHIL. Q. 109, 110 (1995) (citing McCloskey, 
supra, for proposition that "[i]n cases of coercion proper, ... there is ... a choice, which 
arises out of deliberation about alternatives, i.e., an act," and basing the authors' own 
distinction between force and coercion upon his); Michael Rhodes, The Nature of Coercion, 
34 J. VALUE INQUIRY 369, 370 (2000) ("The notion that coercion does not involve a choice 
being made by the coerced agent is nonsensical, but pervasive. With genuine instances of 
coercion, expressions such as 'so and so was forced to surrender his wallet' are entirely 
misleading if 'forced' is understood to imply an absence of free will or choice. A gunman 
relies upon the victim's capacity for choice when attempting coercion, and assumes that the 
victim will choose his life over his wallet. Even though the choice might be easy if the 
person values his life much more highly than his wallet, it remains the case that a choice 
must be made. Thus it is inaccurate and untrue to say, 'I had no choice, since I had a gun 
placed to my head.' What should be said in such cases is that 'I had only one reasonable 
alternative and as such the choice was effortless .... Coercion necessarily involves a choice 
being made in light of certain conditions being proposed by another agent."). 
n See, e.g., Rob Stein, Teenage Girl in Botched Organ Transplant Dies, WASH. POST, Feb. 
23, 2003, at All. 
78 See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, U.S. Citizens Get More Organs Than They Give, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at A3 (noting fact that Jesica and her family were illegally smuggled 
into United States). 
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"Your PIN number or your life." What will you do? Surely the "correct" 
choice is not at all obvious. Or rather, it might be absolutely clear to you 
that you will risk anything, including your life, rather than give away 
that PIN number. The point is simple but important: as long as we can 
imagine realistic cases in which the choice might be made either way, the 
coercive choice remains a real choice. A rich conception of coercion, 
therefore, will not distinguish coercion from choice per se; instead it will 
focus on the question of which choices are coercive and which ones are 
not.79 
2. ThreatofSanction 
How, then, ought we to distinguish coercive choices from noncoercive 
ones? We can hypothesize that a coercive choice is one in which the 
coercer has weighted the choice by threatening to do something wrong, 
something that deprives the victim of one or more moral rights. Now, it 
should be clear that not all deprivations of choice involve moral wrong. 
Only some restrictions on choice - the coercive ones - involve such a 
wrong. 
A slightly modified example offered by Robert Nozick reveals the 
conceptual roots of this element.80 Imagine a world populated by fifty-
one people, comprised of twenty-six men and twenty-five women. 
Following Nozick's parameters, suppose further that all members of 
each sex agree on the same ranking of all members of the other sex in 
terms of desirability as marriage partners and that all members of the 
society want to get married. Thus, for purposes of marital desirability, 
we might name the men A to Z and the women A • to Y •, in decreasing 
preferential order. Presumably A and A • will choose to marry each 
other. B would like to marry A •, and B • would like to marry A. Those 
choices have been precluded, however, by the prior voluntary choices of 
A and A • to marry each other. B and B •, then, if they want to be 
married at all, will marry each other, and so on down the line: each 
succeeding person would, if given the choice, marry those ranked above 
himself or herself in the preferential ordering, but instead marries the 
best possible mate he or she can get. Now we've reached Y, who is 
considering his available options. Y would prefer, if given the choice, to 
marry one of A • through X •, but they have chosen to marry above him. 
79 See, e.g., Bernard Gert, Coercion and Freedom, in COERCION 30, 32 0. Roland Pennock 
& John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (arguing that coercive choices are internally different from 
noncoercive ones). 
80 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 263 (1974). 
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His choices are dramatically constrained as compared to all the men 
before him; he may marry Y • or not marry at all. Poor Z is quite out of 
luck; by the time we reach him, all the available women are married, and 
he has no choice to marry at all! 
Z's choices have been dramatically constrained - down to none, in 
fact. But has Z been coerced into staying single? Surely not. Z's 
predicament is the result not of coercive force but of the legitimate 
choices of other freely acting individuals. No threat or intentional 
constraint has been used upon Z to force him into remaining single, nor 
has Z been unfairly placed in a situation in which he is unable to marry.81 
The mere fact that Z does not, as a matter of fact, have the choice to 
marry is not enough to demonstrate coercion. A compelled action is not 
necessarily a coerced one. Only when a choice has been wrongly 
weighted by the threat of a sanction does that choice involve coercion.82 
Thus, the second reason that we call the robbery hypothetical "coercive" 
is that it does feature such a threat: give me your money and I will let 
you go; refuse me your money and I will kill you. 
3. Coercive Intent 
The threat from our hypothetical robber is intentional in two senses: 
the robber has intentionally subjected his or her victim to a choice -
between her money and her life - that she would not otherwise have to 
make, and the robber has intentionally weighted that choice in favor of 
the robber's wishes. In illustration, consider a scenario drawn from Peter 
Westen's provocative article, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words 
81 See, e.g., id. at 262 ("Other people's actions place limits on one's available 
opportunities. Whether this makes one's resulting action non-voluntary depends upon 
whether these others had the right to act as they did."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, 
Coercion, and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REv. 79, 84 (1981) ("[T]rue duress or coercion results 
when one's rights are violated by others .... "). 
" Coercion, because it does involve the threat of a sanction, has been distinguished 
from the related concepts of pressure, manipulation, exploitation, persuasion, temptation, 
and seduction. The robber who holds a gun to your head and demands your money has 
coerced you; the man who offers you a mink coat to sleep with him has not. See, e.g., 
McCloskey, supra note 76, at 335 ("To exercise coercion is to exercise power. But not all 
exercises of power are exercises of coercion. Power may be exercised via the use of force, 
by manipulation, conditioning, pressure, as in social pressure, individual pressure, group 
pressure . . . . Whilst various of these forms of power are loosely characterized as forms of 
coercion, there are good reasons for distinguishing coercion proper from all these forms of 
power .... Because coercion figures prominently- and rightly so- in moral, legal, and 
political issues, it is important that it be distinguished from these other forms of power and 
influence."). 
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and Vice Words.83 Westen develops an example using Frederick 
Douglass, who spent half his life as a slave. In this context Westen poses 
two connected hypotheticals that are exactly on point. First, Westen 
establishes that 
a constraint that X[l] brings to bear on X is not "coercion" unless 
X[l] knows he is bringing the constraint to bear on X. If Frederick 
Douglass's master goes pheasant shooting in the fields without 
knowing that Douglass is working there and by unwittingly 
shooting in Douglass's direction causes Douglass to take shelter, we 
might say that the master has "caused" Douglass to take shelter, or 
has "forced" Douglass to take shelter, but we would not say that he 
has "coerced" Douglass into taking shelter because the master did 
not know he was bringing the constraint to bear on Douglass. This 
suggests ... [that] coercion is a constraint, Y, that X[l] brings to bear 
on X to do Z(l), where X[l] knows he is bringing Y to bear on X.84 
As Westen immediately goes on to explain, however, this formulation 
does not go far enough in describing X[l)'s requisite level of 
intentionality: 
Assume that Frederick Douglass's master wishes to shoot pheasant 
in the fields where he knows Douglass is working, but he does not 
wish Douglass to quit working; he takes care, therefore, to shoot 
over Douglass's head with the wish and expectation that Douglass 
will continue working; Douglass, becoming afraid that he will be 
shot, quits working. We might say in that event that by knowingly 
shooting over Douglass's head, the master has "caused" Douglass to 
quit working, but we would not say that Douglass's master has 
coerced him into quitting work. To constitute coercion, [the coercer] 
must not only knowingly bring a constraint to bear on [the coercee], 
but he must bring it to bear for the purpose or with the expectation 
of causing [the coercee] to do [what the coercer wants him to do]. 
"Coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve another 
man's will, not for his own but for the other's purpose."85 
83 Peter Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"- Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 541. 
84 Id. at 560-61. 
" ld. at 561 (quoting F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 133 (1960), and citing 
LAWRENCE CROCKER, POSITNE LIBERTY 17 (1980) ("[T]here is a strict use of 'coercion' which 
requires the intent to influence behavior .... "));see NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND 
SociAL DEMOCRACY 235 (1982) ("To be one who coerces is to act purposively."); Michael D. 
Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION, supra note 79, at 16, 21 ("Dispositional coercion 
is thus distinguished from mere threats by an agent's intent that a victim act in a specific 
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To the extent that intentionality is a central component of coercion, it 
would seem that coercive threats are necessarily human in origin. Some 
scholarly accounts have suggested as much.86 The presence of 
intentionality has also suggested to some that coercion is fundamentally 
a moral, as opposed to purely descriptive, concept.87 Thus, suppose 
Professor X requires that her law students pass a final exam in order to 
get credit for her required first-year property class. Students who do not 
pass the exam will fail the course. Professor X's students are "forced" to 
take her exam if they want to pass the course, but we would not say that 
the professor has coerced them into taking it. Compare this to the case in 
which Professor X tells a student: "Sleep with me or you will fail my 
course." Here, we have no problem finding a coercive use of power. 
The difference is not the amount or kind of force - in both cases, the 
threatened penalty for noncompliance is failing the course - but its 
moral legitimacy. 
It is also true that some definitions of "coercion" focus on its 
descriptive properties, claiming that whether or not coercion is wrongful 
is a different question from whether or not it exists.88 According to this 
second, non-normative conception, coercion simply describes a situation 
in which one party compels another, by means of a threat backed by 
force, to make a choice between alternatives, one of which is favored by 
the coercing party.89 According to this view, the use of coercion against 
someone may or may not be wrongful, depending on other 
manner."). 
86 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS IN LIBERTY 122 (1969) ("(C]oercion implies the 
deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise 
act."). 
87 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 81, at 87 ("True duress [or coercion) ... requires not 
merely an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible for creating the necessity of 
making that choice."). 
88 See, e.g., ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, COERCION AND AUTONOMY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS, ISSUES, AND PRACTICES 25 (1986) ("(l)n law and legal theory both normative 
and nonnormative conceptions of coercion can be found," and "in moral theory and ethics 
coercion is understood with regard to some presumed notion of prior individual freedom, 
autonomy, or rational agency but with normative and nonnormative variations, depending 
on the writer's final purpose .... "); Rhodes, supra note 76, at 369 (defending descriptive 
account of coercion on grounds that "(p ]roviding a non-evaluative, descriptive account 
allows the separation of the normative judgment from the identification of the 
phenomenon thereby described. Asserting that something is an instance of coercion does 
not commit us to any particular normative assessment of it. Whether or not, being an 
instance of coercion, it is also wrongful or unfair remains an open question."). 
89 See, e.g., J. Roland Pennock, Coercion: An Overview, in COERCION, supra note 79, at 1, 
1 ('"Coercion signifies, in general, the imposition of external regulation and control upon 
persons, by threat or use of force and power."' (citation omitted)). 
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circumstances or background conditions. These include the harm to the 
coercee if he or she accedes to the coercer's will, the equality or lack 
thereof (as defined by the individual theorist) between coercer and 
coercee, and whether the use or threatened use of force violates the 
coercee's pre-existing rights.90 
Our intuitions about the normative content of coercion depend, in 
part, on whether the coercer is a person or the state. The term 
"coercive," as applied to relations between individuals, is usually 
normative, signifying the coercing party as a villain and the coerced 
person as a victim. In the interpersonal context, the philosopher Jeffrie 
Murphy is right that "[t]rue duress [or coercion] ... requires not merely 
an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible for creating the 
necessity of making that choice."91 In contrast, when we speak of 
coercion by the state we often adopt a descriptive definition, in which 
state "coercion" is both synonymous and coextensive with the state's 
power to enforce the law. Thus, legal and political philosophers 
frequently examine the conditions under which state coercion is justified, 
implying that such coercion is sometimes justified and sometimes not.92 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Supreme Court's use of the 
coercion test under the Establishment Clause is that it applies the 
90 See, e.g., Rhodes, supra note 76, at 369-74. 
91 See Gorr, supra note 74, at 383 (citing, but not agreeing with, view that "coercion is 
an essentially normative concept whose 'conditions of application contain an ineliminable 
reference to moral rightness or wrongness"' (citation omitted)); Murphy, supra note 81, at 
87. 
92 See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Rationally Justifying Political Coercion, 15 J. PHIL. REs. 79, 79 
(1989-90) ("Without coercion government would fail. Hence, the central problem of 
political philosophy is how to justify coercion by government."); McCloskey, supra note 76, 
at 350 ("A serious political approach to coercion raises two types of issues. The more basic, 
general issue relates to determining criteria for legitimate, permissible coercion. What 
kinds, degrees of coercion ought the state to engage in itself, what ought it to permit, and 
what ought it to ban? Are general criteria or rules possible, or must each case be 
determined on its merits? If the latter, what constitute the relevant merits?"). The legal 
positivists extended this debate into the realm of law. See, e.g., John Austin, A Positivist 
Conception of lAw, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 24, 25-26 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 7th 
ed. 2004) ("Every law ... is a command . ... [A] command is distinguished from other 
significations of desire by this peculiarity: that the party to whom it is directed is liable to 
evil from the other, in case he comply not with the desire."); H. L.A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of lAw and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 596 ("'The existence of law is one thing; 
its merit or demerit is another."' (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED 184 (Library of Ideas 1954) (1832))); id. at 53 ("What both Bentham and Austin 
were anxious to assert were the followir!g two simple things: first, iri the absence of an 
expressed constitutional or legal provision, it could not follow from the mere fact that a 
rule violated standards of morality that it was not a rule of law; and, conversely, it could 
not follow from the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of law."). 
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normative v1s1on of coercion to the behavior of the state. In the 
Establishment Clause context, the Supreme Court appears to assume that 
state coercion is never justified and that it is always an unconstitutional 
violation of a citizen's rights. In evaluating a claim under the coercion 
test, the Court does not ask: "Is this a case in which state coercion is 
justified or not?" Instead, it assumes that religious-based coercion by the 
state is per se unconstitutional. If the state forces citizens to make a 
choice between religion and nonreligion and weights that choice by 
imposing a sanction for choosing one way or another, then the state has 
always, by definition, violated the Clause.93 
B. Reconsidering the Core Elements 
To summarize the argument thus far: the robber-victim scenario is 
coercive because (1) it presents the victim with a choice (between her 
money and her life) that she would not otherwise have to make, (2) that 
choice has been wrongly weighted by the robber with a sanction for the 
refusal to choose in accordance with the robber's wishes, and (3) both the 
choice and the sanction have been intentionally inflicted on the victim by 
the robber. In the Establishment Clause context, the Supreme Court 
applies this normative conception of coercion to its evaluation of the 
state's behavior under the coercion test. 
1. The Elements of Indirect Coercion 
Must all three of the above elements be present in order for a 
particular choice to be coercive? This is a key question for the purposes 
of the Establishment Clause coercion test, because one could argue that 
the conception of state coercion applied to cases of indirect coercion, such 
as Lee v. Weisman94 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,95 
contains only one of the three elements. Under the test enforced in those 
cases, the state unconstitutionally "coerces" a citizen when it presents 
her with a choice between religious and nonreligious behavior and that 
state-authored choice is a choice she would not have faced in the absence 
" See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("Undoubtedly, 
the [football] games are not important to some students, and they voluntarily choose not to 
attend. For many others, however, the choice between whether to attend these games or to 
risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one. The 
Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult choice on 
students .... ") . 
.. 505 u.s. 577 (1992). 
•• Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290. 
2006] Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause 1647 
of state intervention. Thus, the first element, a forced choice, is required 
under the test. But that element apparently also defines the entirety of 
the test. In both Lee and Santa Fe, the Court made clear that the negative 
sanctions at issue were not penalties created or enforced by the state. 
Rather, the sanction was the potential for social pressure or ostracism by 
a religious dissenter's peers in the event that a dissenter chose not to say 
the challenged prayer or not to attend the event in order to avoid saying 
it.96 Thus, at least initially, it does not appear that the Court requires the 
state actor to weight the choice with a sanction in order for there to be 
unconstitutional coercion. 
The Court's coercion test also does not appear to require the state to 
have intentionally organized, or set in motion, this p~er pressure in order 
for its actions to be found unconstitutionally coercive. The Court does 
state in Lee that "the government may no more use social pressure to 
enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."97 But in neither 
Lee nor Santa Fe does the Court's holding rely upon evidence that the 
schools in those cases intentionally brought, or attempted to bring, peer 
pressure to bear on dissenting students, either to attend the voluntary 
events at issue or to say the challenged prayer at those events.98 It would 
seem, then, that by the word "use" the Court did not necessarily mean 
"deploy with conscious purpose." But is it really "coercive," for 
Establishment Clause purposes, for the state to present dissenters with a 
choice they would not otherwise have whenever some sanction, whether 
or not imposed by the state, might conceivably follow? Such a broad 
vision of coercion could severely restrict the state's ability to 
accommodate religion and "take it into account."99 For every time the 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 50-62. 
97 Lee, 505 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added). 
98 On the contrary, see for example id. at 588 ("Petitioners argue, and we find nothing 
in the case to refute it, that the directions for the content of the prayers were a good-faith 
attempt by the school to ensure that the sectarianism which is so often a flashpoint for 
religious animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony."). In Santa Fe, the Court 
did note plaintiffs' claim that dissenting students were rebuked for their beliefs. 530 U.S. at 
295 ("In their complaint the Does alleged that the District had engaged in several 
proselytizing practices, such as ... chastising children who held minority religious beliefs . 
. . . "). But the Court cited no evidence that the state intentionally "used" social pressure to 
enforce the challenged prayer policy. Nor did the Court suggest that such evidence exists 
or rely upon the assumption that it exists in deciding the case. 
99 See, e.g., supra note 36; infra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Van Orden v. 
Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 175, 178 (2003) (affirming these principles). In upholding the 
constitutionality of a Ten Commandments display located on the grounds of the state 
legislature of Texas, the Perry Court said that although the government must be "neutral" 
toward religion, 
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state overtly tried to do so and some negative consequence resulted 
which the state had neither intended nor inflicted, the state's 
accommodation attempt would have to be struck down under the 
Establishment Clause. This cannot be the right result. State action 
frequently presents citizens with choices, including choices that have 
religious dimensions. Alongside the Court's worries about state-induced 
coercion of religious behavior, the Court has also clearly said that the 
state may not be affirmatively hostile toward religion,100 that a total 
eradication of religion from the public sphere would be neither possible 
nor desirable/01 and that the state may even "accommodate religion and 
take religion into account" in making policy.102 Any standard under 
neutrality is not self-defining. It does not demand that the state be blind to the 
pervasive presence of strongly held views about religion with myriad faiths and 
doctrines. Nor could it do so. Religion and government cannot be ruthlessly 
separated without encountering other First Amendment constraints, including its 
guaranty of the free exercise of religion. Such hostility toward religion is not 
only not required; it is proscribed. It is not the case that the Establishment 
Clause is so inelastic as to not permit government some latitude in recognizing 
and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society .... "Neither 
government nor the United States Supreme Court can or should ignore the 
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship 
God and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically 
from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of the 
existence of religion." 
Id. at 178 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) 
(Goldberg,]., concurring)). 
100 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
("In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First 
Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion 
in general."). 
101 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, ]., concurring) 
(stating that government display of creche in circumstances of case is "no more an 
endorsement of religion than such governmental 'acknowledgements' of religion as 
legislative prayers of the type approved in Marsh v. Chambers, government declaration of 
Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of 'In God We Trust' on coins, and opening 
court sessions with 'God save the United States and this honorable court.' Those 
government acknowledgements of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in 
our culture, ... legitimate secular purposes .... "(citation omitted)); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) 
("'This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) 
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment 
Clause.' It is well-established, too, that '[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to 
religion are by no means co-extensive with the non-interference mandated by the Free 
Exercise Clause.' There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent 
neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without 
interference."' (citations omitted)). 
102 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 ("Government efforts 
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which the state is forbidden ever to create a choice that involves religion 
would not only be impractical, it could also affirmatively contradict the 
accommodation theme in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. Thus, we should not read the Establishment Clause to 
say simply: "Indirect coercion exists whenever the state requires citizens 
to make a choice that has religious implications." 
2. The Role of Causation 
What then is the best interpretation? Beyond the actual results in its 
cases, the Supreme Court has offered few clues as to the theory of 
indirect coercion that lay behind the holdings in Lee and Santa Fe. It may 
be possible, however, to discern a theory that logically produces those 
results. One would prefer to work from a rule that would dictate the 
various conceptions of indirect coercion available and therebr ensure 
that one has covered the entire field of viable interpretations.10 Absent 
such a rule, it is difficult, albeit not impossible, to identify and examine 
all the viable theories of indirect coercion. The problem of setting limits 
to indirect coercion is really one of connecting the state's behavior to the 
feared harm in a way that justifies barring the state from a challenged 
religious activity. Thus, in Lee and Santa Fe the Supreme Court 
expressed its fear that public school students' right to dissent from the 
majority's religious views could be limited by peer pressure on 
dissenters to say, or otherwise support, school-sponsored monotheistic 
prayer.104 The Court connects such peer pressure to the state via the 
concept of indirect coercion. But what does this mean? What must the 
to accommodate religion are permissible when they remove burdens on the free exercise of 
religion."); id. at 631 ("Clearly, the government can acknowledge the role of religion in our 
society in numerous ways that do not amount to an endorsement. Moreover, the 
government can accommodate religion by lifting government-imposed burdens on 
religion."); id. at 663 ("[W]e have never held that government's power to accommodate and 
recognize religion extends no further than the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause. To 
the contrary, '[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means 
coextensive with the non-interference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."' (citation 
omitted)). 
103 One wishes, in other words, for an investigative process as compelled and 
comprehensive as that in an Agatha Christie novel. A brilliant detective is called in to solve 
a baffling murder that was committed on a moving train. Ten others were on board when 
the crime was done. The detective's investigation is beautifully boundaried both as to 
scope - the ten survivors are the only possible suspects - and as to process - he 
proceeds by interviewing each of the ten and assessing his or her potential liability. The 
train scenario is of course based on the famous novel, AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE 
ORIENT EXPRESS (1934). 
104 See supra text accompanying notes 50-62. 
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kind and degree of connection between the state's behavior and the 
feared harm to religious rights be in order for the Establishment Clause 
to prohibit the state from engaging in a challenged activity? When we 
know the answer to that, we will know the boundaries of the Court's 
vision of indirect coercion. 
In law we employ two means of connecting a harmful event to the 
actions of an individual defendant. The question "Was this defendant 
responsible for this legally addressable harm?" really presents two 
issues for the law: (1) did the defendant cause the harm, and (2) did the 
defendant possess the requisite level of mens rea or intent to be held 
legally responsible for the harm? Thus, we might ask the question: "Do 
intent or causation place any discemable boundaries around the concept 
of indirect coercion?" If so, what are those boundaries? 
Consider again the paradigm case: the robber, the alley, and the 
choice between "your money or your life." Now suppose you know that 
R, the "robber," is an eight-year-old child and holds no weapon. 
Suppose further that no other basis exists on which R might enforce a 
sanction against you. Finally, R makes no threat of a sanction; he simply 
walks up to you and says: "Give me your money, or not." If you decide 
to comply with this request, have you been coerced into doing so? 
Surely not. You have been presented with an unweighted choice 
between parting with your wallet or not doing so; if you decide to give R 
your money, your choice is freely, and completely, your own. 
Now suppose it turns out that R is a local homeless child who is 
haimless and beloved in the town. Under the longstanding custom of 
the town, everyone gives R money on demand. Suppose that if you 
refuse to give R money and the town finds out about your refusal, some 
(perhaps even most) townspeople may think less of you and may even 
refuse to associate with you on the grounds that you are a Scrooge. 
Rather than face the wrath of the town, you decide to give R some 
money. Has R coerced you into this action? How would one go about 
deciding the answer to that question? 
Assume, for the moment, that social pressure can be "coercive" in 
whatever sense we define "coercion"105 and that in this situation you can 
"' Philosophers have argued that social sanctions can be at least as harmful as state-
imposed ones. In his famous essay On Liberty, for example, the great libertarian 
philosopher John Stuart Mill made the following case: 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, 
held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But 
reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant - society 
collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it - its means of 
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therefore make the credible claim, "I was coerced." But were you 
coerced by R? Our theory of coercion suggests that in order to assign 
responsibility toR, there must be some link between R's action (asking 
you for money) and the potential effect of that action (your social 
ostracism). That link, in the general theory, is supplied by the 
requirement of intent. So if R asks you for money, explaining that if you 
refuse he will punish you by calling down the wrath of the town, then R 
has weighted the choice by a sanction ("S"), although the sanction would 
not actually be imposed by R. This seems true whether or not R is the 
actual means by which the town finds out about your refusal. It matters 
not whether R goes to the mayor's office to report your stinginess or 
whether R purposely confronts you when you and R are standing two 
feet away from the Town Gossip, knowing that he or she will 
immediately relate your refusal to the appropriate authorities. In either 
case, where R knows what the potential consequences of refusal are and 
R knows that you know as well, R has weighted his request with 
coercive force. 
Suppose, however, that R has not acted with a conscious purpose as 
above and that S is not a reasonably foreseeable result of R's request. 
Instead, it is merely possible that your refusal to comply with R's request 
will lead to your social detriment. For example, suppose that R has 
tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its 
political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it 
issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with 
which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than 
many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, 
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also 
against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of 
society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices 
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, 
and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with 
its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its 
own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with 
individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as 
protection against political despotism. 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ON LIBERTY, THE 
SUBJECllON OF WOMEN, AND UTILITARIANISM 6-7 (2002). 
The philosopher H.J. McCloskey brings the concept of social tyranny within our 
definition of "coercion" by noting that although social tyranny is not "intentional" in the 
sense that society as a whole has no conscious purpose of oppressing the individual, such 
pressure can be coercively and intentionally exploited by agents who do have the capacity 
for conscious purpose. See generally McCloskey, supra note 76. 
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accosted you in a deserted street and you know that R normally does not 
report those who refuse to give him money to the authorities. If you 
decide to give R money rather than face the mere possibility of social 
ostracism for not doing so, has R coerced you into giving him the 
money? Probably not. Thus, it would seem that the more remote the 
possibility of the sanction that you fear, the more the analysis shifts away 
from assigning responsibility to the choice-creator and toward re-
assigning responsibility for your choice to you. But at what point does 
that responsibility shift? Must there be at least a 50% likelihood that S 
would result from your refusal to give R money? Greater than 50%? 
What if the likelihood is less than 50% but still substantial, say 30%? 
Furthermore, how would one go about assessing such statistical 
probabilities? 
Consider a final possibility. Suppose that R did not intend to tell 
anyone about your refusal and that he did not actually know for certain 
that anyone would find out. Nevertheless, it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the town would find out and would, on that basis, subject you to 
ostracism. Knowing this, and to avoid that negative consequence, you 
decide to giveR money. With respect to the sanction of social pressure 
on you, R in this case is both a but-for cause (a cause without which the 
sanction would not happen) and a proximate cause (in that the social 
pressure is a reasonably foreseeable result of R's request). R has 
intentionally created a situation in which you choose in a certain way 
because you fear a sanction and that sanction is a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the choice. Has R coerced you into giving him money? 
Peter Westen would insist that R has coerced you only when R has the 
conscious purpose of bending you to his will.106 Under Westen's 
analysis, therefore, R would not be guilty of coercion in this scenario. 
But what about when the question is not one of interpersonal coercion 
but of coercion by the state? Is there a good reason to weaken the causal 
link between coercer and act when the state, and not an individual, is 
accused of being coercive? 
3. Is State Coercion Different? 
Here, it seems, we must move from the analytical realm into the realm 
of policy. The question then is not: "What state behavior is inherently 
coercive, and what is not?" Rather, the question becomes: "Is state 
coercion that is premised, not on intentionally inflicted sanctions against 
'"' See supra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
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religious dissent, but on reasonably foreseeable sanctions, properly 
deemed 'coercive' from the standpoint of the Establishment Clause?" 
At least three reasons support an answer of "yes." First, the proximate 
cause vision of indirect coercion fits well with the factual situations in Lee 
and Santa Fe. In both cases the Court rested its holding- that the state 
had indirectly coerced religious dissenters- not on any express state-
imposed sanctions for religious dissent, but on the possibility that such 
dissent would be met by the negative sanction of social pressure from 
dissenting students' peers. In both cases the Court, in assigning the label 
"coercion" to the state's behavior, declared: "To recognize that the 
choice imposed by the State [between participation in the prayer and 
protest against it] constitutes an unacceptable constraint only 
acknowledges that the government may no more use social pressure to enforce 
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."107 In neither case does the 
Court cite evidence that the state intentionally- with conscious purpose 
- deployed social pressure to enforce religious orthodoxy. Indeed, had 
the public schools in Lee and Santa Fe consciously encouraged students 
who favored the challenged prayers to ostracize those who opposed 
prayers, then these state actors would clearly be guilty of religious 
coercion. But such intentional coercion did not appear to motivate the 
Court's opinions in these cases or its statement that the state may not 
"use" social pressure. The best reading of that statement relies not on 
conscious purpose but on foreseeability. That is, where it is reasonably 
foreseeable by the state that significant negative social sanctions may 
follow a state-created choice between religion and nonreligion, the 
choice is "coercive" for the purposes of the Establishment Clause, even 
when the state has not expressly weighted it with state-enforced 
sanctions. Thus, although the public schools in Lee and Santa Fe may not 
have intentionally deployed social sanctions against dissenters who 
refused to say the challenged prayers, it was reasonably foreseeable by 
the schools that such sanctions would result from religious dissent and 
that such sanctions might have a particularly negative impact on 
impressionable adolescents in a school setting.108 Reasonable 
107 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992) (emphasis added); see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("For 'the government may no more use social 
pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."' (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. 
at 594)). 
108 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 ("[O]ur decisions ... recognize, among other things, that 
prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern 
may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there."); id. at 593-94 
("Research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often 
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is 
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foreseeability constitutes a sufficient link between the state-authored 
choice and the feared sanction to merit the label "coercion." 
A second reason that a forced choice premised on reasonably 
foreseeable sanctions is properly deemed "coercive" is that this reading 
makes sense from a policy standpoint, particularly in the context of state 
coercion. In other First Amendment contexts, perhaps most notably the 
protection of speech, the Court has made clear that it will take 
constitutional notice not only when the government has expressly 
banned a particular form of speech, but also when government action, 
although not clearly intended to suppress speech, has a "chilling" effect 
on the rights protected by the Free Speech Clause.109 The conception of 
indirect coercion developed in Lee and Santa Fe erects a functionally 
equivalent buffer zone around the right of religious minorities not to be 
coerced by their government into majoritarian religious belief or 
behavior. Thus, in the context of the state's relationship to the citizenry 
under the Bill of Rights, the proximate cause-based vision of indirect 
coercion not only fits well with the Court's holdings but serves 
understandable, and justifiable, constitutional purposes. 
Finally, the proximate cause conception renders the idea of indirect 
coercion more transparent to state actors making judgments about when 
they may and may not constitutionally present citizens with choices 
between religion and nonreligion. Just as the state may not "chill" 
speech by legislating in ways that suppress that important individual 
right, the state may not chill religious dissent by requiring citizens to 
make choices between religion and nonreligion when such choices will 
foreseeably be weighted by significant sanctions in favor of one side or 
the other. This interpretation of the Court's vision of indirect coercion 
should help state actors make better judgments about the potential 
chilling effect of their actions upon religious dissent. It could also give 
states a powerful incentive to study the problem and take affirmative 
steps to avoid the imposition of social sanctions on religious dissenters in 
schools. In the educational setting, for example, schools could train 
students in the value of religious tolerance, or punish students who 
violate the standard of tolerance, or both. Under the coercion test as 
strongest in matters of social convention. To recognize that the choice imposed by the State 
constitutes an unacceptable constraint only acknowledges that the government may no 
more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."); see also 
Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Lee for same proposition). 
109 In that case, the Free Speech doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth apply. See, e.g., 
DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 49-53 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing Supreme Court's 
use of vagueness and overbreadth doctrines to address "chilling" effects). 
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developed here, such actions by a school could prevent studE'nts from 
putting social pressure on religious dissenters and thus forestall 
constitutional liability for state actions designed to recognize and 
d t 1. . 110 accommo a e re 1g10n. 
4. When Is Coercion Religious? 
Under the coercion test thus developed, plaintiffs Michael Newdow111 
and Edward Myers112 appear to have a strong argument that when the 
state mandates the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public 
schools, it has indirectly coerced dissenting students, even if such 
students have the right not to say the Pledge and the state expressly 
acknowledges that it is not allowed to punish them for refusing. Under 
the test for indirect coercion, the question becomes: "Is it reasonably 
foreseeable by the school district that requiring children to say the 
Pledge in public school will have a coercive effect, consisting of social 
sanctions inflicted on dissenting students by their majoritarian peers as a 
result of their refusal?" If so, then the Pledge is indirectly coercive 
within the meaning of the test. 
But coercive of what? As noted above,113 one important issue that 
arises with particular force in the Pledge cases is the question of when 
the state has coerced religious exercise - an action that is 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause - and when it has not. 
Assume we can agree, as Lee and Santa Fe suggest, that in the public 
school setting, social sanctions that are reasonably foreseeable results of 
state action are in some important sense "coercive." Nevertheless, such 
coercion violates the Establishment Clause only if it "establishes 
religion" -if it forces citizens to engage in religious behavior or to make 
choices on religious grounds that they would not otherwise be required 
11° Cf Lee, 505 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (averring that majority decision in 
case "is only a jurisprudential disaster and not a practical one. Given the odd basis for the 
Court's decision, invocations and benedictions will be able to be given at public school 
graduations next June, as they have for the past century and a half, so long as school 
authorities make clear that anyone who abstains from screaming in protest does not 
necessarily participate in the prayers. All that is seemingly needed is an announcement, or 
perhaps a written insertion at the beginning of the graduation program, to the effect that, 
while all are asked to rise for the invocation and benediction, none is compelled to join in 
them, nor will be assumed, by rising, to have done so. That obvious fact recited, the 
graduates and their parents may proceed to thank God, as Americans have always done, 
for the blessings He has generously bestowed on them and on their county."). 
111 Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S. (Newdow Ill), 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (E. D. Cal. 2005). 
112 Myers v. Loudon County Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005). 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73. 
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to make. In the case of prayers such as those involved in Lee and Santa 
Fe, this issue does not arise because all parties acknowledge that the 
challenged state-sponsored event is religious in nature. In the case of the 
Pledge, however, how should we determine whether something that all 
seem to admit is primarily a patriotic exercise nonetheless contains 
enough of a religious component to go beyond mere 
"acknowledgement" of religious and into "establishment" of it? 
In the end, this may well be the issue that drives any Supreme Court 
decision on the merits of an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
Pledge. Yet, the answer is not at all clear, and Court precedent presents 
few attractive options. Perhaps the easiest option would be to once 
again exhume the much-dishonored Lemon test and, in particular, its first 
prong, commanding that a challenged state action must have a secular 
purpose in order to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. Under that 
test, which the Court most recently invoked in the 2005 case of McCreary 
County v. ACLU,114 the Pledge, unarguably enacted with a patriotic 
purpose and for more than a decade containing no religious language at 
all, may well survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. But the vagueness 
and manipulability of this prong, not to mention of the Lemon test as a 
whole, has attracted justified condemnation both from within and from 
outside the Court.115 The Court would only add fuel to the fire by 
converting the real question in the Pledge cases -when a state action or 
declaration becomes "religious" under the Clause - into the quite 
different question of what the government's intent was when it enacted 
the challenged measure. 
There is a core problem with the logic in the Lemon approach, one that 
Justice O'Connor attempted to solve by reframing the first two prongs of 
Lemon into the endorsement test. 116 In answering the question of whether 
a challenged state action has a "secular purpose" under Lemon, the Court 
has repeatedly conflated two quite separate questions: that of the 
legislature's intent in approving the challenged measure and that of the 
probable effect of the challenged measure on, in the words of the 
endorsement test, the "reasonable observer."117 That this has caused 
confusion is evident from one of the Ninth Circuit opinions in Newdow v. 
114 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2732-37 (2005) (stating that under Lemon, state's manifest objective 
may be dispositive of constitutional inquiry). 
m See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
'" See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984). 
117 See, e.g., McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2734-
36 (conflating purpose prong of Lemon with probable effect on endorsement test's 
reasonable observer). 
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U.S. Congress (Newdow 1),118 in which the court declared: "The coercive 
effect of the Act [challenged by plaintiff Newdow] is apparent from its 
context and legislative history, which indicate that the Act was designed 
to result in the daily recitation of the words 'under God' in school 
dassrooms."119 The court thus inferred the effect of the challenged statute 
from its purpose, its "design." Importantly, however, the question of the 
legislature's purpose is distinct from the question of whether the 
reasonable observer is likely to see the state-enacted measure as 
religious, or nonreligious, in nature. 
The ad hoc nature of the inquiry into purpose has appeared in other 
ways as well. In one of the 2005 "Ten Commandments" cases, McCreary 
County, the Court affirmed a lower court judgment that a display of the 
Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses had no valid 
secular purpose.120 The Court found this to be the case despite the 
simultaneous display of "the Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, 
the Mayflower Compact, the National Motto, the Preamble to the 
Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice."121 By contrast, in 
another case, Van Orden v. Perry,122 the Court affirmed rulings by the 
lower federal courts that a monument displaying the Ten 
Commandments and placed on the grounds of the Texas state capitol 
did, in fact, evince a valid secular purpose.123 The Court found this valid 
secular purpose in the fact that the monument was one of seventeen 
monuments and twenty-one historical markers "commemorating the 
'people, ideals, and events that compose Texan identity."'124 Of 
particular relevance to the Court's finding of invalidity in McCreary 
County was the Court's rejection of the counties' position that their 
purpose in erecting the Ten Commandments display should be assessed 
not by looking at the entire history of the display, which went through 
three iterations during the litigation, but by viewing the latest version of 
the display as surrounded by other, more secular documents attesting to 
the "Foundations of American Law and Government."125 On the 
118 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), rev'd, 
542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
119 Id. at 609. 
120 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2745. 
121 Id. at 2731. 
122 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
123 Id. at 2864. 
124 Id. at 2858. 
125 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2736-37. 
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contrary, declared the Supreme Court: "The Counties' position just 
bucks common sense: reasonable observers have reasonable memories, 
and our precedents sensibly forbid an observer 'to turn a blind eye to the 
context in which [the] policy arose."'126 This reasoning suggests that the 
Court will not look favorably on any attempt by plaintiffs to depict the 
Pledge itself as primarily religious in nature, on the ground that 
Congress's action in adding the words "under God" to the Pledge in 
1954 must, on its face, have been motivated by a primarily religious 
purpose. Instead, the reasoning in McCreary County suggests that the 
Court would consider the addition of those words, and the purpose 
behind them, as only one fact in the history of the Pledge as a whole. 
Indeed, no one argues that the enactment of the Pledge was not 
motivated at all by a valid secular purpose. The Court may thus have 
signaled in McCreary County that, to the extent it relies on the secular 
purpose prong of Lemon, and of the endorsement test, neither the Pledge 
of Allegiance nor state policies mandating its recitation in public school 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
A second, and related, option for the Supreme Court would be to 
deploy the fig leaf of "ceremonial deism," which the Court has invoked 
in the past in order to defend its insistence that some state-backed 
mentions of religion -those that have presumably been bled of primary 
religious significance by time and repeated usage- are allowed under 
the Clause.127 As other scholars have pointed out, however, the 
government may no more require citizens to attend a ten-second, or even 
two-second, religious exercise than it may require them to attend 
services at a certain church every Sunday.128 The particularly religious 
significance of the words "under God" is apparent not only in the fact 
that Congress specifically added those words to the Pledge twelve years 
after first enacting it without religious references, but also on the face of 
the Pledge, which declares the speaker's affirmative belief that the 
"United States of America" is "one nation, under God."129 The question 
126 ld. at 2737. 
127 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow II), 542 U.S. 1, 36-37 
(2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("This case requires us to detennine whether the 
appearance of the phrase 'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance constitutes an instance of 
such ceremonial deism. Although it is a close question, I conclude that it does .... "); 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (stating that Nebraska's practice of hiring chaplain 
to open sessions of state legislature does not violate Establishment Clause). 
128 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 8, at 829 ("The brevity of the religious element does not 
distinguish it. Surely, the state could not compel attendance at a ten-minute Mass or a five-
minute sermon."). 
129 In its ruling in Myers v. Loudon County Public Schools, the Fourth Circuit, which 
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presented is not whether the legislature intended the Pledge to have 
religious significance or whether the Pledge has been around long 
enough that its apparent religious significance is no longer remembered 
or taken seriously. The question for the Court is whether state-mandated 
use of the words "under God" compels a declaration of fidelity to 
religion and thus violates the command of the Establishment Clause that 
the government remain neutral among the different religions and 
between religion and nonreligion. 
In Myers v. Loudon County Public Schools/30 in which the Fourth Circuit 
upheld the Pledge against an Establishment Clause challenge, the 
majority directly addressed this issue, declaring that "[t]he inclusion of 
these two words ['under God'] ... does not alter the nature of the Pledge 
as a patriotic activity. The Pledge is a statement of loyal~ to the flag of 
the United States and the Republic for which it stands."1 1 By contrast, 
"[t]he prayers ruled unconstitutional in Lee, Schempp, and Engel, . .. were 
viewed by the Court as distinctly religious exercises," and "[t]he indirect 
coercion analysis discussed in [those prior cases] simply is not relevant 
in cases, like this one, challenging non-religious activities."132 Thus, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded, "[e]ven assuming that the recitation of the 
Pledge contains a risk of indirect coercion, the indirect coercion is not 
threatening to establish religion, but patriotism."133 The Supreme Court, 
should it choose to address the merits of an Establishment Clause 
challenge to the Pledge, should accept the chance to address this core 
issue. 
III. RECONSTRUCTING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. The Role of the Coercion Test 
To summarize, this Essay has sought to explore the potential of the 
coercion test to bring a measure of clarity to the Court's fog-afflicted 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. According to the Court's vision of 
coercion under the Clause, the state has directly coerced a citizen when it 
ultimately upheld the Pledge against Establishment Clause challenge, nonetheless 
acknowledged, "[u]ndoubtedly, the Pledge contains a religious phrase, and it is demeaning 
to persons of any faith to assert that the words 'under God' contain no religious 




133 ld. at 408. 
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(1) intentionally (2) forces him or her to make a choice between religion 
and nonreligion (or between one religion and another) and (3) weights 
that choice with an express negative sanction (such as a legally imposed 
fine or other punishment) for choosing in a way that the state does not 
approve. Such coercion "by force of law and threat of penalty"134 is 
involved when, for example: the state requires citizens to attend a state-
approved church; the law mandates that only state-endorsed clergy may 
perform religious sacraments; or religious dissenters face any state-
authored penalty that is expressly designed to promote either a 
particular religious sect or to promote religion as a whole.135 Under the 
Court's conception of indirect coercion, a state-mandated choice between 
religion and nonreligion may be unconstitutionally coercive even though 
the state has expressed no preference as to how the choice should be 
made, it has not intentionally weighted the choice with a legal penalty, 
and the source of any negative sanction is not the state but the behavior 
of private citizens who may seek to pressure or ostracize a religious 
dissenter into complying with the majority religious view. In such cases, 
however, according to the best reading of the Court's coercion test as 
applied in Lee v. Weisman136 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe,137 the state has behaved coercively only when the negative social 
sanction is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of requiring religious 
dissenters to make the choice in question. In Lee and Santa Fe, the 
potential for social ostracism of dissenters was both foreseeable and 
substantial, since both cases occurred in school settings and involved the 
potentially great influence of social pressure on vulnerable teenaged 
students.138 
Read in this fashion, the coercion test may point the way toward a 
restructuring of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a 
whole. The function of the coercion test, as interpreted in this Essay, is to 
deal with cases in which a state-mandated choice could either directly 
result in state-authored penalties directed at religious minorities, or 
foreseeably result in penalties inflicted on such minorities by nonstate 
134 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow (Newdow !I), 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); Lee, 
505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
135 See cases cited supra note 134. This is, of course, the vision of coercion articulated by 
Justice Scalia in Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-41. 
136 Lee, 505 U.S. 577. 
137 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
138 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 ("[O]ur decisions ... recognize, among other things, that 
prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern 
may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced there."). 
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sources. But is the coercion test an all-inclusive method of evaluating the 
constitutionality of state action under the Clause? Introducing the test in 
his opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,139 Justice Anthony Kennedy 
suggested that coercion might serve as the sole method of evaluating 
state action under the Establishment Clause, particularly when the 
concept of indirect coercion is folded in.140 Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that "some of our recent cases reject the view that 
coercion is the sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation."141 
These cases have held that proof of government coercion is not required 
to demonstrate an Establishment Clause violation.142 But Justice 
Kennedy argued that this is true only if "coercion" means "direct 
coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of religion that the 
Framers knew."143 That is, proof of direct coercion is not a necessary 
component of a successful Establishment Clause claim. Unconstitutional 
coercion, however, may also be indirect, and Justice Kennedy seemed to 
argue here that once the idea of indirect coercion is incorporated, 
coercion does become the "touchstone" of an Establishment Clause 
violation.144 "Absent coercion," he concluded, "the risk of infringement 
of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal."145 
Justice Kennedy appeared to argue that a showing of either direct or 
indirect state coercion should be both necessary and sufficient to prove 
an Establishment Clause violation.146 
However, the coercion test fails to deal with another category of state 
actions - those captured under the rubric of state "endorsement," 
where no coercion of any kind is involved. Under Justice O'Connor's 
endorsement test, even where the state has concededly not coerced 
religious behavior, either directly or indirectly, state action may 
nevertheless violate the Clause if it creates the impression, in the mind of 
the reasonable observer, that the state has endorsed religion over 
nonreligion, or vice versa. 
139 492 u.s. 573 (1989). 
140 Id. at 660-62. 
141 Id. at 660. 
142 See id. at 597 n.47. 
143 Id. at 660-61. 
I« See id. at 660. 
145 Id. at 662. 
146 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 8, at 823 ("It is probable ... that Justice Kennedy 
continues to believe that his Allegheny formulation is the correct one- not only a doctrinal 
minimum but a maximum as well- and will adhere to it in future cases."). 
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B. The Role of the Endorsement Test 
The intuition that government endorsement, even where not coercive 
in any defensible sense, can violate the Establishment Clause is one that 
deserves separate recognition by the Court. Two examples demonstrate 
this. First, consider the Court's method of analysis in another 
Establishment Clause context - that of religious displays on public 
property. In the most recent iterations of this situation, plaintiffs 
challenged privately donated displays of the Ten Commandments at two 
county courthouses, in McCreary County v. ACLU}47 and on the grounds 
of the Texas state legislature, in Van Orden v. Perry}48 claiming that the 
displays violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court reached 
contrary constitutional holdings in the cases, but assumed that the 
correct tests to apply were the Lemon, or the endorsement tests, or both. 
Neither holding relied upon the coercion test, which makes perfect sense 
because the state's behavior in these public display cases was clearly not 
coercive, either directly or indirectly. 
One could, perhaps, interpret the state in McCreary County and Perry 
as having presented citizens with a forced choice. The argument might 
be that the presence of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse 
forces a choice between going there and being exposed to the Ten 
Commandments and not going in order to avoid such exposure. 
However, the key difference between the state actions in McCreary 
County and Perry and the state's behavior in Lee and Santa Fe is that in 
the school prayer cases the Court feared a potentially powerful negative 
sanction - social pressure from the peers of religious dissenters -
resulting from either the failure to attend or, having chosen to attend, the 
failure to say the challenged prayer. In the Ten Commandments context, 
no such sanction looms. In choosing whether or not to visit the 
courthouse, a reasonable person would not fear that her choice not to go, 
or to avoid reading the Ten Commandments display if she did choose to 
go, would bring social condemnation or ostracism.149 At the very least, 
'" 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2727 (2005). 
"' 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005). 
"' Of course, some people are compelled to visit the courthouse or the legislative 
grounds, and as to them, the issue of coercion may be a closer question. Still, would it 
really be credible to argue that being required to walk past a display of the Ten 
Commandments on the grounds of your state legislature or your local courthouse 
constitutes government coercion under the Establishment Clause? Or is this situation more 
analogous to that of Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where, in the context of the Free 
Speech Clause, the Court responded to the argument that the defendant, by wearing the 
message "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket into a public courthouse, had forced that message 
upon other listeners. Id. at 16. The Court's response was that "[t]hose in the Los Angeles 
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the possibility of such ostracism was much more distant in the Ten 
Commandments cases than it was in Lee and Santa Fe. To the extent that 
there is an Establishment Clause problem with the Ten Commandments 
cases, it lies not in the presence of state coercion but, as the lower courts 
in McCreary County and Perry recognized, in the possibility that the 
displays demonstrated state favoritism - endorsement - of religion 
over nonreligion. 
As a second example of why endorsement without coercion deserves 
scrutiny, consider a variation on the facts of Lee and Santa Fe. Suppose 
that those cases had not involved negative sanctions (i.e., the threat of 
social ostracism) on students who refused to say the prayer at football 
games or the graduation ceremony. Suppose, instead, that the schools 
had offered the best seats at the game and the graduation to students 
who agreed beforehand to say the challenged prayer. Undoubtedly the 
Court would have no problem finding that such offers violate the 
Establishment Clause. But would it do so on grounds that such a policy 
is coercive? Surely not. Under the conception of coercion developed 
here, the state action in that case would not be unconstitutionally 
coercive, either in a direct or an indirect sense. Instead, one suspects, the 
Court would strike down the policy on endorsement grounds, on the 
basis that, while not coercive, the challenged state action would signal to 
a reasonable observer that the state was partial toward religion over 
nonreligion. An interpretation of coercion as encompassing state-backed 
threats of harm and not state-backed offers of benefits fits well with 
Supreme Court precedent. According to that precedent, negative 
sanctions against religious dissenters have been analyzed under the 
coercion test, while the state's affirmative promotion of particular 
religious beliefs or behavior has been scrutinized under the endorsement 
test, with its underlying mistrust of state action that causes some citizens 
to feel excluded from the political community on religious grounds.150 
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by 
averting their eyes." Id. at 21. Religious dissenters can of course do the same thing, with 
impunity, when passing by the Ten Commandments. Any claim of government coercion 
must be greatly weakened by that fact. 
150 See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community."). In 
Allegheny, the court stated: 
[T]he word "endorsement" ... derives its meaning from other words that this 
Court has found useful over the years in interpreting the Establishment Clause. 
Thus, it has been noted that the prohibition against government endorsement of 
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Thus, an offer of a benefit for performing a religious activity seems to be 
a prime candidate for consideration under the Endorsement test. This 
teaches us something very important about the Court's solution to the 
old problem of creating a distinction between threats and offers that is 
strong enough to support a clear and well-contained definition of 
"coercion."151 Under the Court's actual practice, those cases which 
involve the deliberate infliction of unwanted sanctions on religious 
dissenters have been scrutinized under the coercion test, while offers of 
benefits to those who engage in state-preferred religious activity have 
been analyzed under the endorsement test. There is nothing necessary 
religion "preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a 
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 
[Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)] (O'Connor, U.,] concurring) (emphasis 
added). Accord, [Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1989)] 
(separate opinion concurring in judgment) (reaffirming that "government may 
not favor religious belief over disbelief" or adopt a "preference for the 
dissemination of religious ideas"); [Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 
(1987)] ("preference" for particular religious beliefs constitutes an endorsement 
of religion); [Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963)] (Goldberg, 
]., concurring) ("The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that 
government . . . effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and 
nonreligion"). Moreover, the term "endorsement" is closely linked to the term 
"promotion," [Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691] (O'Connor,]., concurring), and this Court 
long since has held that government "may not ... promote one religion or 
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite," 
[Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)]. See also [Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59-
60] (using the concepts of endorsement, promotion, and favoritism 
interchangeably.) 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (citations modified from original). 
151 A good deal of scholarly ink has been spilled on the question of whether a coercive 
restraint must involve a threat or a burden, or whether offers can also be coercive. See, e.g., 
Westen, supra note 83, at 570 ("Everyone agrees that not all constraints or promises of 
constraint are coercive. They disagree, however, about what distinguishes coercive 
constraints from noncoercive constraints. Some distinguish between 'threats,' 'penalties,' 
and 'burdens,' on the one hand, and 'offers,' 'rewards,' and 'benefits,' on the other; the 
former are coercive, they say, while the latter are not. Others reject the distinction, arguing 
that offers, rewards, and benefits can indeed be coercive."). The problem, some have 
argued, is the weakness of the analytical distinction between threats and offers; threats can 
easily be recast as offers and vice versa. Take our classic "your money or your life" case. 
Intuition tells us that the robber's demand is a coercive threat, and so it is. But it could 
easily be recast as a genuine offer: "I will let you live if you agree to give me your money." 
Similarly, an "offer" by B to pay A $1000 if A agrees to speak to B's garden club can be 
reframed as a "threat" to deprive A of the money if A does not speak to the club. But see id. 
at 569-87 (arguing that debate over whether offers and benefits can be coercive is 
"semantic," and proposing different set of baselines against which to measure choices as 
coercive or noncoercive); id. at 589 ("Coercion can thus be defined as a constraint [fulfilling 
certain other conditions], ... and where Y leaves X worse off either than he otherwise 
expects to be or than he ought to be for refusing to do X[1]'s bidding."). 
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about this division; one could, perhaps, shoehorn some cases involving 
offers into a valid conception of coercion for purposes of the 
Establishment Clause. However, confining the meaning of "coercion" to 
those cases involving the threat of a sanction matches well with our 
common intuitions about what "coercion" means, and thus forms the 
basis for an intelligible standard that has predictive value. 
The endorsement test, of course, has met with a good deal of criticism 
both on and off the Court152 and has never consistently won the 
allegiance of any justice other than its author, Justice O'Connor. But the 
core intuition of the test - that the state may not make religion relevant 
to a citizen's standing in the political community, even by measures that 
fall short of being affirmatively punitive - seems both distinct from the 
penalty-based prohibitions of the coercion test and also quite compatible 
with that test in the sense that the tests deal with two distinguishable 
types of state action both of which are, and ought to be, unconstitutional 
under the Establishment Clause. 
C. The Tests in Action 
This suggests a two-step structure to the analysis of state action under 
the Establishment Clause.153 In a first, threshold inquiry, the Court asks 
whether the challenged state action is either directly or indirectly 
coercive under the coercion test as conceptualized above. If the answer 
to that initial inquiry is "yes," then the state's action is unconstitutional 
and no further inquiry is necessary.154 If the answer to the coercion 
question is "no," then the Court proceeds to a second level of inquiry, 
under which it asks whether the challenged state action, although 
concededly not coercive, violates the endorsement test by creating 
political hierarchies based on religion. Again, the endorsement inquiry 
is substantively distinct from the coercion one because the court does not 
ask whether forced choices exist or whether foreseeable penalties have 
weighted those choices. Instead, the Court asks how a reasonable 
152 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
153 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating that coercion test 
constitutes threshold inquiry into Establishment Clause violation), with Newdow v. U.S. 
Cong. (Newdow I), 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), rev'd, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) ("We 
are free to apply any or all of the three tests [for an Establishment Clause violation], and to 
invalidate any measure that fails any one of them. Because we conclude that the school 
district policy impermissibly coerces a religious act and accordingly hold the policy 
unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the policy fails the endorsement test or the 
Lemon test as well."). 
154 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 ("[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise."). 
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observer would view this concededly noncoercive state action. Would a 
reasonable observer conclude that the state, by engaging in the 
challenged action, has demonstrated partiality either toward or against 
religion, or toward or against a particular religion? If so, the action is 
unconstitutional; if not, it is not. 
Do the coercion and endorsement tests, working together, articulate a 
complete theory of the Establishment Clause? That is, are there cases in 
which the Establishment Clause ought to prohibit state action although it 
is not coercive and does not create, in the mind of the reasonable 
observer, a perception that the state has created a political hierarchy 
based on religion? In thinking about this question one must consider a 
third line of cases - those involving funding for religious schools - that 
the Court has decided under the Clause.155 The most recent example of 
such a case is Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 156 In that case the Supreme 
Court upheld a school voucher program in Cleveland against the 
challenge that the program violated the Establishment Clause because 
96% of participating students used their vouchers to attend religious 
schools. En route to this holding, the Court instructed that "[t]he 
Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into 
sending their children to religious schools .... "157 The Court decided that 
Cleveland's voucher program did not involve such coercion, that it was 
instead an instance where "true private choice" had produced the 
challenged result, and that it therefore did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.158 No one claimed that the state of Ohio had expressly required 
parents to send their children to religious schools; such an express 
requirement would clearly violate the Establishment Clause.159 But the 
background reality of Ohio's compulsory school attendance law160 raised 
155 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishmrnt 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001) {"These two propositions- that public aid should 
not go to religious schools, and that public schools should not be religious - make up the 
separationist position of the modem Establishment Clause."). 
156 536 u.s. 639 (2002). 
157 Id. at 655-56 (emphasis added). 
158 Id. at 653 ("We believe that the program challenged here is a program of true private 
choice ... and thus constitutional."). 
159 Such a requirement would be an example of direct coercion, which no one doubts is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 {Scalia, J., dissenting) {"The coercion that was 
a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and 
of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty."). 
160 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (West 2002) ("Every parent of any child of 
compulsory school age ... must send such child to a school or a special education program 
that conforms to the minimum standards prescribed by the state board of education, for the 
full time the school or program attended is in session .... "). 
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the problem of coercion in another guise. If, as a practical matter, 
parents could comply with the compulsory attendance law only by 
sending their children to religious schools, then direct coercion was 
clearly involved because the choice not to educate one's children in 
religious schools would automatically subject parents to the legally 
enforced penalties for failure to comply with the compulsory attendance 
law. In deciding the question of whether coercion existed, both the 
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence focused on the 
availability of nonreligious school choices. The Court held that the 
presence of such choices made the state's voucher program noncoercive 
because it allowed parents to choose secular schooling for their children 
while also complying with the state's compulsory attendance law.161 
Zelman, in other words, involved a claim of direct coercion, and the 
Court put the issue of coercion at the center of its decision in the case.162 
The mere fact, in Zelman, that taxpayer money, including the money of 
taxpayers who are not religious, went to support religious schools was 
not enough to violate the Establishment Clause. Only if the parents who 
were given control of that money via the voucher program were coerced 
into choosing a religious over a secular education would the program be 
liable for a constitutional violation. The operation of the coercion test 
161 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655-56 ("There ... is no evidence that the program fails to 
provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options 
for their school-age children. Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational 
choices .... The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into 
sending their children to religious schools, and that question must be answered by 
evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to 
obtain a program scholarship and then choose a religious school."); id. at 672 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("I find the Court's answer to the question whether parents of students eligible 
for vouchers have a genuine choice between religious and nonreligious schools persuasive. 
In looking at the voucher program, all the choices available to potential beneficiaries of the 
government program should be considered."). 
162 In his concurrence in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (Newdow II), Justice 
Clarence Thomas wrote that, under the "coercion test" as articulated in Lee, the state's 
behavior in Newdow II would be coercive. 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004). According to Thomas, 
"[a]dherence to Lee would require us to strike down the Pledge policy, which, in most 
respects, poses more serious difficulties than the prayer at issue in Lee . . . . [A]lthough 
students may feel 'peer pressure' to attend their graduations, the pressure here is far less 
subtle: Students are actually compelled ... to attend school." Id. at 46-47 (citation 
omitted). Of course, under West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943), students are free not to be present, or not to participate in saying, the Pledge of 
Allegiance. ld. at 642. But under the conception of coercion articulated here, it may well be 
reasonably foreseeable that such refusal or nonattendance could result in social pressure on 
dissenting students. If so, then the type of policy involved in Newdow II could be coercive, 
unless the school took affirmative action to discourage and prevent any social ostracism of 
religious dissenters. 
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was the core issue in Zelman and accounted for the Court's decision in 
that case. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that the conjunctive application of the coercion and 
endorsement tests could offer a basis for analyzing Establishment Clause 
issues that is both coherent and intelligible to the state actors whose 
behavior the Clause constrains. The Court's vision of coercion has wide 
and defensible application to a broad, but appropriately boundaried, 
range of situations in which the state requires citizens to choose between 
religious and nonreligious behavior. Charitably interpreted, the coercion 
test offers a valid basis on which the Court can deal with both the 
methodological discordance and the specific doctrinal confusions that 
continue to haunt its jurisprudence under the Establishment Clause. 
